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RECENT CASES
ADVERSE POSSESSION-EXTENT OF POSSESSION.-HOLAND v. NANCE,
114 S. W. 346 (TEx.),-Where the owner of land in fencing, included by
mistake a portion of an adjoining tract, and thereafter, on discovering
his mistake purchased an alleged outstanding title to the adjoining tract,
and recorded the deed and paid taxes on the entire tract from the time
of recording, but continued to occupy and cultivate only the potion he
had originally included by mistake, held. that limitations would not run
as to that part of the tract not enclosed or occupied, though the recorded
deed was for the entire tract.
It is the general rule that where a person, having a colorable title,
enters upon land which is not in any adversary possession, his possession
is deemed to be co-extensive with the boundaries as described in the
writing or transaction which gives him colorable title to the land. Donohue
v. Whitney, 133 N. Y. 178; Barger v. Hobbs, 67 Ill. 592. Actual posses-
sion of the whole tract is unnecessary provided there has been an entry
upon and an actual possession of part of the tract. Montgona Coal Co. v.
Blair, 51 Ia. 448. But some courts put a limitation upon the general rule
to the effect that the actual occupancy of only a part of the tract under
colorable title will give possession to the remainder provided it is naturally
connected with, and adaptable to use with the part actually occupied.
Murphy v. Doylc. 37 Minn. 113; Thompson v. Burhans, 6I N. Y. 52.
BOARD OF HEALTH-LIA13ILITIES.-VALENTINE V. CITY OF ENGLEWOOD,
71 ATL 344 (N. J.).-Held, that the members of a board of health, acting
in performance of a public duty under a public statute to prevent the
spread of an infectious or contagious disease, are not personally liable in
a civil action for damages arising out of their acts in establishing a
quarantine, even where the disease does not exist, provided they acted in
good faith.
Public policy demands that those to whom the public welfare is en-
trusted are not to be hampered in their work, which as a rule demands
prompt action, by fear of civil proceedings against them as individuals
and generally, therefore, health officers, if they are acting in good faith,
are not held personally liable for errors of judgment, where they are
afforded some discretion, either implied or express, under the statute
under which they are acting. Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. 8o; Seavey v.
Prebl, 64 Me. 12o; Rohn v. Osmun, 143 Mich. 68. But where the statute
under which the board is created gives bnly administrative powers the
personnel of such board act at their peril, when destroying property or
interfering with personal liberty, without an order of court, and they have
been held liable for damages so caused. Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540;
Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151. In either case they lay themselves open
to an action for tort where negligent or acting in excess of their authority.
Hersey v. Chapin. 162 Mass. 176; Brown v. Murdock, 140 Mass. 314;
Barry z. Smith, 191 Mass. 78.
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CARRIERS-CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS-EJECTION OF PERSON AT PLACE
OTHER THAN STATION.-CAHER v. GRAND TRUNK Ry. Co., 71 ATL 225
(N. H.).-Held, that a carrier which ejected a person from a train for
nonpayment of fare at a place other than a passenger station, in violation
of a public statute, is not necessarily liable for resulting damages, but it
must appear that it occurred through its failure to perform the duty im-
posed by statute; and, to recover, the ejected person must prove the in-
sufficiency of the station at the place of expulsion, his own care, and that
the injury resulted from defendant's fault. Bingham, J., dissenting.
The common law rule is that a railroad may eject at any place a
passenger who refuses to pay his fare. Scott v. Clev., Cin., Chi. & St.
Louis Ry. Co., 144 Ind. 125; Rudy v. Rio Grande Western Ry Co., 8
Utah 165. But this rule is qualified in that the ejectment must be at a
place that is reasonably safe from danger. Wyman v. Northern Pacific
Ry. Co., 34 Minn. 210; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Grant, 38 Kan. 6o8.
Another qualification is that where a statute provision forbids the
ejectment of a passenger at a place other than a station, an action for
damages will usually lie. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Casey, 52 Tex. 112;
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Harper, 69 Ark. 186; Loomis v. Jewett,
Receiver, Eric R. Co., 35 Hun. (N. Y.) 313. But the passenger would
he entitled only to nominal damages, unless circumstances warranted
greater recovery. Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Roberts, 40 Ill. 503. On the
other hand it has been held that where a person went on the train intend-
ing not to pay fare, and refused to do so, became a trespasser and
could be ejected at any place, the statute provision not applying to tres-
passers. Lillis v. St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern Ry. Co., 64 Mo. 464.
CARRIERS-CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATION.-
LocKWOOD v. BOSTON ELEVATED Ry. Co., 86 N. E. 934 (MAss.).-Held,
that where the plaintiff and his companion desiring to become passengers
signaled an open car, and the motorman having inclined his head, they
started from the sidewalk and on it being stopped, boarded the car with
the conductor's knowledge, and the plaintiff had reached and stood upon
the running board on his way to a seat at the time of his injury, the
relation of passenger and carrier had been established.
It is a well established point of law that a person is a passenger if a
street car has been stopped for him and he is in the act of getting aboard
when the car starts. Gordon v. West End St. Ry. Co., 175 Mass. 181.
And the carrier is bound to give him reasonable time to enter and leave
its cars and while it may start before the passeuger is seated, it must
exercise the greatest degree of care that a cautious and prudent man
would use under the same circumstances in starting a car so as not to
jerk or jar and thereby injure him. Barth v. Kan. City Elevated Ry. Co.,
142 Mo. 535. Some courts regard the carrier as the offeror, and hold the
acceptance as not made- until the offeree has actually boarded the car.
Chicago Union Traction Co. v. O'Brien, 219 Ill. 8o3; Donovan v. Hartford
St. Ry. Co., 65 Conn. 201. The weight of authority, however, considers
the sign to the motorman as the offer and the checking the speed of the
car as the acceptance. Brien v. Bennett, 8 C. P. 724; McDonough v. Met.
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R. R. Co., 135 N. E. 682. The payment of fare is not necessary to create
the relation of common carrier and passenger. Rose %,. Railroad, 39
Ia. 246.
CARRIERS-INJURY TO FREIGHT-EVIDENCE.-DUNCAN %. GREAT NORTH-
ERN RY. Co., II8 N. W. 826 (N. D.).-Held, on proof of delivery of the
property to the carrier in sound condition, and of its redelivery by the
same carrier at end of the route in damaged condition, or a failure to
redeliver it, a sufficient case is made to sustain a recovery for the damages
or loss by the shipper.
It is well settled that at common law a common carrier is an insurer
of the goods intrusted to him and is responsible for all losses to the same,
save such as are occasioned by act of God or the public enemy. Angell on
Carriers, § 67, 148, 153; N. J. Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants' Bak, 6
Howard 381. The right of a common carrier to limit his responsibility
by a special contract has long been settled law in England. Carriers' Act,
i83o. And in this country it is settled by the great preponderance of
authority that such carrier may avoid all liability except from its own
negligence, by a special contract. York v. Central R. R., 6 Allen 489. The
doctrine that he may avoid all but gross negligence is repudiated in Chris-
tenson v. American Express Co., 15 Minn. 208, 270. In case of such
special contract, the burden of proof is still on the carrier to show not
only that the cause of loss was within such exception but that there was
no negligence on his part. 2 Greenl. E., 219. The liability for live stock
is the same as for other freight except for loss or injury resulting from
the nature and propensities of the animals themselves. Cooley on Torts,
3rd Ed., 1351.
CONTRACTS-LEGALITY--RELIEF-PART PERFORMANCE.-SAUERHERING V.
RUEPING, ii N. W. 184 (IVls.).-Held, that where there is part per-
formance of an illegal contract, the court will not aid either party thereto.
Marshall and Barnes, J. J., dissenting.
In illegal contracts, partly performed, the courts make a distinction
between those that are merely inalum prohibitum, and those inalum in se,
and hold that in the former class money paid. thereon can be recovered.
Pratt z. Short, 79 N. Y. 437; Knowlton v. Spring Co., Fed. Case No.
7903 (N. Y.). So, though the contract is void, money which has been
paid on a lottery ticket may be recovered. Wardell v. Waite, 7 Johns.
(N. Y.) 434. And, even though wagers are void by statute, money de-
posited with a stakeholder may be recovered by the loser even after the
event has taken place; Wheeler v. Spenser, I5 Conn. 28; Lewis v'. Burton,
74 Ala. 317; and the same rule applies where the money on a fully executed
illegal contract remains in the hands of a mere depository. Woodworth
%, Bennett, 43 N. Y. 273. Notwithstanding the illegal contract, the com-
plaining party can recover if he can establish his case without relying
upon the illegality of the transaction. Phalen v. Clark, i Conn. 421. And
it seems to be settled that after a contract, confessedly against public
policy, has been carried out and money contributed by one partner, the
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other partner in whose hands the profits are, cannot refuse to account for
and divide them on the grounds of the illegal character of the original
contract. Brooks v. Martin, 69 U. S. 70; Central Trust Co. v.
Ohio Cent. Ry., 23 Fed. 3o6. The general principle, however, as
to contracts malum in se is that they are against public policy and the
courts will not aid either party to escape the consequences. Goodrich v.
Tenny, 144 Ill. 422; Oliver v. Gilmnan, 52 Fed. 562.
CONTRACTS-SEVERABLE CONTRACTS.-JoHNsoN ET AL. V. FFHSEFEDDT,
x8 N. W. 797 (MINN.)-Held, that the mere fact that a price has been
affixed to each bushel of a crop contracted to be threshed, is not sufficient
to make it severable.
It is the universal rule that the intention of the parties determines
whether a contract is entire or severable. Shinn ct aL v. Bodine, 6o Pa.
St. 182. And this intention must be discovered by considering the
language employed and the subject matter of the contract. Southwell v.
Bee-cley, 5 Ore. 458. The consideration to be paid is a means of determin-
ing this question. Clay Commnercial Tel. Co. v. Root, 4 Atl. 828 (Pa.);
but it is frequently a question of fact. Mingct et al. v. Corbin, 142
N. Y. 334.
CRIMINAL LAw-CONFESSIONs-ADMISSIBII.ITY.-PEOPLE V. OWEN,
1I8 N. W. 59o (MIcH.).-Where one was arrested after having attempted
to commit murder, and without expressing any desire to make a state-
ment, was put under oath by a notary and examined by the chief detective
in the presence of a police commissioner, two police officers, and the
official stenographer of the police department, and in the course of such
examination made answers which amounted to a confession, held, that
such confession was voluntary and admissible in evidence. Moore and
McAlvay, J. J., dissenting.
The simple fact that a confession is made to a police officer does not
render it inadmissible; Peoplc v. Rogers, I8 N. Y. 9; even if made in reply
to questions, in the absence of any inducements of hope or fear. Spicer
v. State, 69 Ala. i59. But it is a well settled rule that an extra judicial
confession is not admissible in evidence against the accused unless it has
been freely and voluntarily made. Wilson v. U. S., 162 U. S. 622. And
this rule applies when the prisoner has been influenced by any inducement
of hope or fear, however slight, for the reason that the law cannot
measure the force of the influence used or decide upon its effect on the
mind of the prisoner. People v. Clark, IO5 Mich. i69. So where a prisoner
testifies he must not be sworn, for if to the embarrassments and perplexities
of the situation are added the danger of perjury and the dread of addi-
tional penalties, the confession can scarcely be regarded as voluntary, but
on the contrary it seem to be made under the very influences which the
law is particularly solicitious to avoid. Greenleaf on Evidence, § 225;
State v. Garvey, 25 La. Ann. 191.
CROPS-DEED OF LAND-ORAL RESERVATION OF GROWING CROPS FOR
THIRD PERSoN.-BEcK V. McLANE, 114 N. Y. Supp. 44.-After the tenant
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of the plaintiff's farm had sowed rye. on an oral agreement that half the
crop was to belong to him, and that he might harvest it after the expira-
tion of the lease, the plaintiff conveyed the land to the defendant who
orally agreed to respect the agreement with the tenant. Held, that the
rye being personal property and belonging to a third person, the agree-
ment between the parties to the deed amounted to a constructive sever-
ance of the rye, and effectively reserved or excepted it. McLennan. P. J.,
and Kruse. J., dissenting.
When land is sold which has upon it immature crops, these crops
generally pass with the land. Brown v. Thurston, 56 Me. 126; Trip v.
Haseig, 20 Mich. 254. However, there are some cases where the title
to the crops does not thus pass. One case is where the crop has been
severed by a valid sale, Austin v. Sawyer, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 39. but this
sale must be in writing to satisfy the Statutes of Fraud. Powell v. Rich,
41 Ill. 466. Another exception is where by weight of authority the crop
is reserved by a written agreement at the time of the sale. Mcllvaine v.
Harris, 20 Mo. 457; Clap v. Draper, 4 Mass. 266. Contra: Backenstoss v.
Stahler, 33 Pa. St. 251, holds that crops may be reserved by parol agree-
ment.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL EVIDENcE-REFORMA7TION OF A
WRITTEN AGREEMENT.-HUGHES V. PAYNE, 117 N. W. 363 (S. D.).-Held,
that where the reformation of a written contract is sought on the ground
of mistake resulting front the omission of certain terms, parol evidence
is admissible to prove the mistake and the omitted terms. Fuller, J.,
dissenting.
The general rule is that parol evidence prior or contemporaneous to
a written agreement is not admissible for the purpose of contradicting,
altering or in any way varying it. Courtwright v. Burns, 13 Fed. 317. In
equity this rule applies as well as in law, but here it is subject to the
exceptions of fraud, accident or mistake in which cases the courts will
grant relief. First National Bank v. Bast, 101 U. S. 93. But the contrary
has been held in Rhode Island. Macomber v. Peckman, 16 R. I. 485. In
Pennsylvania, even in courts of law, parol evidence is admissible in case
of fraud, accident or mistake. Melcher v. Hill, 194 Pa. St. 44o. But it
must be borne in mind, that equity will exercise the power of reforming
instruments with caution, and only when a proper case is made by the
pleadings. Striker v. Tinkham, 35 Ga. 176. In all these cases the party
that seeks reformation of the written instrument has the burden of proof.
Smithv. Allen, 102 Ala. 406.
INSURANcE-NON-PAYMENT OF PREMIUM NOTES-EFFEcT.-ARKANSAS
INS. CO. v. Cox, 98 PAC. 552 (OKLA.).-Held, that where two notes are
given in payment of the premium on a fire insurance policy, and no
reference is made to them in the policy, nor the validity of the policy is
in any way made contingent upon the payment of the notes, the policy is
not invalidated by non-payment of the notes at their maturity.
Where a policy provides that if premium notes be not paid the policy
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shall become void, it is a good defense to an action on the policy that the
premium notes were unpaid at the time of the loss. American Ins. Co. v.
Leonard, 8o Ind. 272; Thompson v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co., io4 U. S.
252. But if there is no stipulation to that effect, failure to pay a premium
note at maturity will not defeat the policy. Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff,
45 N. J. Law, (16 Vroom) 543. And a stipulation in the premium note
itself that its non-payment shall avoid the policy (no such provision being
contained in the policy) is nugatory. Ins. Co. v. Hardie, 37 Kan. 674.
However, where a company claims a forfeiture for non-payment of a
premium note, it must offer to surrender the note. It cannot forfeit the
policy and keep the note. Johnson v. Southern Mtt. Ins. Co., 79 Ky. 403.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-EVIDENCE.-DENNISON v. DAILY NEWS Pun. Co.,
118 N. W. 568 ( NEB.).-Held, that in a civil action to recover damages
for libel, it is proper to produce evidence showing the relations existing
between the plaintiff and the author of the alleged libel, for the purpose
of proving that the plaintiff was the person referred to, when his name
does not appear in the article, and the defendant does not admit that he
is the one referred to.
In an action for libel, the plaintiff may show by extrinsic evidence
that the publication referred to him, though it did not name him. Van
Ingen v. M. & E. Pub. Co., 35 N. Y. Supp. 838, And where the person is
ambiguously described, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to establish
the identity. Mix v. Woodward, 12 Conn. 262; Van Vechten v. Hopkins,
5 Johns 21r. It was further held in Mix v. Wood-ward, supra. that the
plaintiff is at liberty to prove that the libel was published of and concern-
ing him in the same manner and by the same kind of evidence as he might
prove any other fact in the case. But an acquaintance of the plaintiff
cannot testify that, uopn reading the libellous publication, he understood
it to refer to the plaintiff. White v. Say-ward, 35 Me. 322. Contra:
Enquirer Co. r'. Johnston, 72 Fed. 443.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTIoN-PROBALE CAUSE-CONVICTION.-SA JTH V.
THOMAS ET AL., 62 S. E. (N. C.) 772.-HIeld, that probable cause for a
prosecution, barring an action for malicious prosecution, is conclusively
established by a conviction, on a confession of guilt before a justice having
jurisdiction of the offense, though there was a reversal on appeal.
To sustain an action for malicious prosecution, it must be shown that
probable cause was lacking for the institution of the proceedings com-
plained of. Ferguson v. Arnow, 142 N. Y. 58o. A conviction is con-
clusive evidence of probable cause. Herman v. Brookerhoff, 8 Watts (Pa.)
24o. But whether or not this proposition is true when the conviction is
followed by an appeal and acquittal gives rise to a conflict of opinion.
The weight of authority'holds in the affirmative. Morrow v. Iheeler &
Wilson Mfg. Co., 165 Mass. 349; Crescent City L. S. Co. v. Butcher's
Union, 120 U. S. 141. But generally with the qualification that the con-
viction in the lower court must have been procured without fraud or
other undue means. Murphy v. Ernst, 46 Neh. I. Another line of authori-
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tics holds, however, that a conviction followed by a reversal upon appeal
is not conclusive of probable cause, but is deserving of great consideration.
Goodrich v. Warner, 21 Conn. 432; Richter v. Koster, 45 Md. 441.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO THIRD PERSONS-ACTIONS-RELA-
TION OF PARTIES.-HiRoux v. BAUM ET AL, I18 N. W. 533 (Wis.).-Hcld,
that one who is running an automobile at the time of a collision with a
person in the street is prima faiie the servant of the owner of the
automobile.
The responsibility of the master for the tortious acts of his servants
grows out of, is measured by, and begins and ends with his control over
them. Caudup s,. Schreiner, 98 Ill. App. 337, and the master is not respon-
sible for acts of the servant, unless the acts were done in the execution of
the authority, express or implied given by the master. Little Miami R.
R. Co. v. Wctmore, 19 Ohio xio. So a master is not liable for an injury
occasioned by the negligence of servant, while driving the horse and
carriage of the master in his absence. Parsons v. Winchell ct al., 5 Cush.
592. Contra: Evans v. Davidson, 53 Md. 245. If servant does the act in
the execution of the authority given by the master, the master is respon-
sible, whether the wrong done be occasioned by negligence or by a wanton
and reckless purpose. Howe '. Newmarch, 12 Allen (Mass:) 49; Gar-
reitnc v. Ducnckel, 5o olo. lO4. A somewhat analogous case is that of
Reynolds v. Buck. 127 Ia. 6oi, where it was held that the owner of an
automobile is not liable for an injury resulting from the negligent opera-
tion of the machine by his son. without the father's knowledge and con-
sent, and not at tile time in his employ or about his business.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY TO SERVANT-ASSUMPTION OF RtsK.-
GILMARTIN ET AL. V. KILGORE, 114 S. W. 398 (TEx.).-Held, that all ex-
perienced employee who undertakes work with knowledge of a defect in
an appliance and of the danger involved in its use and with time for
deliberation, assumes the risk of the resulting injury, though the work is
performed over the protest and by the express command of the employer.
It is a well settled rule that a servant who knowingly undertakes a
hazardous work assumes all risk. Coal Co. v. Jones, 127 Ill. 379. And the
law will presume that he assumed the risk when he entered upon the
duties of the position. Voodworth v. St. Paul, etc., 18 Fed. 282. Yet the
employee may contract to the contrary. Foster v. Pussey, 14 Atl. 545. But
where the master coerces the servant into entering dangerous work, the
servant does not assume risk. Wells, French Co. z,. Gortorski, 5o I11.
App. 445. And there is no obligation on servant to continue at work
under protest. Reese v. Clark, 146 Pa. 465; Snowberg v. Nelson, 43 Minn.
532. The rule rests on the theory that the master is under no obligation
to take more care of the servant than the servant takes of himself. Penn.
Co. v. Lynch, 9o 11. 333; I. B. W. R. R. Co. v. Flannigan, 77 Ill. 365.
But Graham v. Nevburg Orrel Coal & Coke Co., 38 W. Va. 273, holds
that the servant can assume a small risk without forfeiting his right to
recovery.
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MNASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY TO SERVANT-DUTY OF INSPECTION.-
JOHNSTON V. SYRACUSE LIGHTING Co., 86 N. E. (N. Y.) 539.-Held, that
it is the duty of a lineman, before going onto the cross-arm of an electric
light pole to fix wires, to inspect the cross-arm as to its being strong and
sound enough to hold him.
The master personally owes to his servants the duty of using ordinary
care and diligence to provide for them a reasonably safe place to work,
and is bound to inspect it from time to time, and to use ordinary care to
discover and to repair defects in it. Dixon v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
71 Fed. 143. It is held that a telephone company which undertakes to
inspect its poles, as most companies do, will be liable for injuries to a
lineman by the fall of the pole if it neglects to use reasonable care to see that
the pole is safe. McGuire s,. Bell Tel. Co., 167 N. Y. 2o8. But inasmuch as a
servant will be presumed to have notice of, and to have assumed the risks
incident to all dangers and defects, which to a person of his experience and
understanding are, or ought to be patent and obvious; Wood v. Heiges, 83
Md. 257; it seems to be good law, as held in at least one other case similar
in facts to Johnston v. Syracuse Lighting Co., supra, that the lineman is
competent to, and should inspect the cross-arm upon which he is about
to trust his weight. Flood v. Western Union Tel. Co., 131 N. Y. 603.
MASTER AND SERVANT-MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO SERVANT-
-WARNING AND INSTRUCTING SERVANT.-CLEVELAND, C., C. & ST. L. Ry.
Co. v. PERKINS, 86 N. E. 405 (IND.).-Held, that a master need not warn
and instruct employees who are under no disability of dangers patent to
persons of ordinary intelligence.
The general rule is that a master is not bound to give his servants
notice of ordinary dangers, where they are obvious or apparent to any-
one of common intelligence, well known to servant, or subject to ordinary
observation. Findlay v. Russell Wheel & Foundry Co., 1o8 Mich. 286;
Eisenberg v. Fraim, 215 Pa. 570. One court defines an obvious danger,
with reference to the character of an employment, to be one that is dis-
coverable in the exercise of that reasonable care which persons of ordinary
intelligence may be expected to take of their own safety. Hardy v.
Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. Co., 115 N. W. 8. (Ia.). Another court holds that
where it does not appear that there was a statutory duty to give a warn-
ing, no obligation rests upon the master to give such warning. Toledo,
St. L. & W. R. Co. v. Cross, 127 Ill. App. 2o4. When the danger, how-
ever, is not so apparent to a person in the exercise of ordinary care, a
master is bound to warn the servant. Bowen, Jewell & Co. v. Adams, 129
Ga. 688; W. A. Gaines & Co. v. Johnson, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 58; Owensboro
Stave & Barrel Co. v. Daugherty, 110 S. W. 319 (Ky.).
MASTER AND SERVANT-RAILROADS-ENGINEERs-RIs K ASsuMED.-
PEARSALL v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. Co., 112 N. Y. Supp. 872.-Held,
that where an experienced locomotive engineer knew of the improper
location of a semaphore, and was injured in an accident resulting there-
from, no action would lie for injuries sustained.
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It is a general rule, that by remaining in the service of his master
after having learned of the risks of his employment, a servant assumes
such risks, and cannot recover for injuries. Chic. & E. I. R. Co. v.
Geary, i1O Ill. 383. Also when an emlpoyee, after having the opportunity
of becoming acquainted with the risks of his situation, accepts them, he
cannot complain if subsequently injured by such exposure. Masterson -.
Eldridge, 208 Pa. 242. However, the employee takes the risk of knowing
of obvious dangers, and not of others. Scanlon v. B. & A. R. Co., 147
Mass. 484. The servant, although he may know that the instrumentalities of
the business are not in good repair and condition' does not thereby assume
all risks provided the defects be not plainly dangerous. Graham v. New-
bery Orrel Coal & Coke Co., 38 W. Va. 273. In some states the defendant
railroad comapny is estoppel to set up "assumption of risk" by statute.
Walker v. Carolina Cent. R. Co., 135 N. C. 738.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-DEFECTIVE STREETS-INJURIES TO PEDES-
TRIAN-NEGLIGENCE.-WINCKLER V. CITY OF NEw YORK, i13 N. Y. SuPP.
412.-In an action against a city for injuries to a pedestrian slipping on
ice and snow on a sidewalk, evidence held, not to show actionable negli-
gence of the city. Patterson and McLaughlin, J. J., dissenting.
That a municipal corporation is liable for damages arising from neglect
in keeping streets in good condition, is established by many authorities.
Dean v. New Milford Township, 5 W. & S. (Pa.) 545; Pittsburg v. Grier,
io Harris 54. But ordinary care is all that is required on the part of city.
City of Quincy v. Barber, 81 Ill. 300; Town of Grayville v. Whitaker, 85
Ill. App. 6o2. Sidewalks need only be reasonably safe. City of Chicago v.
McGivern, 78 Ill. 347. The city is not liable for mere general slipperiness.
Maunch Chunk v. Kline, IOO Pa. 122; Cloughessy v. City, 51 Conn. 405.
The liability is not affected by the fact that city ordinance requires owners
of property to clean walk in front of their premises. Staton V. City of
Springfield, 12 Gray 571 (Mass.); Wallace v. Mayor, 18 How. i69.
NUISANCE-PUBLIC. NUISANcE-STOP:;G ExPLosIvEs.-FANNING v. J.
G. WhITE & Co., 62 S. E. 734 (N. C.).--Where dynamite is stored in a
shanty, on which there is no warning, near a railroad and a path where
people walk at times, held, that the storing of dynamite was not a nuisance
and did not violate any duty to persons coming on the premises without
a license. Clark, C. J. and Hoke, J., dissenting.
The question as to whether or not the storing of dynamite is a public
nuisance depends upon the locality, the quantity, and the surrounding
circumstances. Lounsbury v. Foss, 30 N. Y. Supp. 89; Heeg v. Licht, 8o
N. Y. 579. It has been held that the storing of explosives so located as to
endanger the household may constitute a nuisance. Enzory v. Hazard
Powder Co., 22 S. C. 476. Also that the storing of explosives on premises
situated near the branch of a navigable river, a railroad and a public road,
is a public nuisance per se. Huntington Land Dcv. Co. v. Phoenix Powder
Mfg. Co., 40 W. Va. 7H1. However, the mere keeping of a large quantity
of gunpowder near dwelling houses does not constitute a nuisance unless
it is negligently and improvidently kept. People v. Lands, I Johns 78.
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STREET RAI. RUOADs-COLLI SION WITlH PE RsO(N ON TRACK-DuTY TO
LooK A-% LISTE.-DE-xis v. LEwisToN. B. & B. ST. Ry. Co.. 70 ATL.
3074 (PA.).-Iield, whether or not the failure of a traveler to look and
listen when about to cross a street railway track, is to hie deemed negli-
gence. must be determined by all the facts and circumstances disclosed by
the evidence.
A traveler about to cross the track of a street railway is hound to
ute ordinary care, and whether it is neglect for him to omit to look and
listen depends on the circumstances. Kon. City, Leaven worth R. Co. v.
Gallgher. 68 Kan. 424; Cin. St. R. Co. -,. Snell, 54 Ohio St. 197; E-vans-
-'ille St. R. Co. -'. Gentry, 147 lnd. 408. Some courts hold that a traveler
must look and listen before crossing. McGee -,. Coi;. St. R. Co.. lO2 Mich.
io7. And whenever the plaintiff's case shows any Want of ordinary care,
his right of recovery is destroyed. Ilarzel z,. Crescent City R. CO.. 49
La. Ann. 1302. It is contributory negligence for a person not to look and
listen before crossing a railroad track, and where the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence does not prevail. iro recovery can he had. Tesch -,. Mil.
Elec. R. & L. Co., IoS Wis. 593.
ToRTs-RELEASE-JOINT AND SEVERAL LIARILITY-RELEASE OF ONE
JOINT TORT-FEASOR.-CLE-LAND, C., C. & ST. L. Ry. Co. v. IIILAGOss. 86
N. E. 485 (IN.).-Plaintiff, a street car conductor, left his car at a rail-
rad crossing to see if any trains were approaching. Seeing none. he gave
the motorman the signal to cross and got on, when defendant negligently
ran a car into the trolley, injuring the conductor. Plaintiff executed a
deed of release to the street car company in satisfaction of all claims
avainst it in consideration of an agreement to re-employ the plaintiff.
Ileld. that while one who compromises a claim does not necessarily admit
that the claim was well founded, the one who receives the consideration
is precluded from denying that it was well founded, and when a pretended
claim for a tort has been settled and satisfaction has been rendered, the
claimant by one so connected with the wrong as to be reasonably subject
to an action and possible liability as a joint tort feasor, the satisfaction
will release all who may be liable, though the one released was not liable.
It is well settled that a release to, or an agreement not to sue, one
in fact liable, which is not under seal and is without full satisfaction of the
claim, is no release of the other tort feasors. Arnett z,. Missouri P. R.
Co., 64 Mo. App. 368; Snow v. Chandler, Io N. H. 92; Matthews v. Chico-
pee Mfg. Co., 3 Robt. 711. But that an absolute release under seal, to, or
full satisfaction from, one joint wrong-doer, releases all for the reason
that there can be but one satisfaction of the same wrong. Ellis z'. Esson,
50 Wis. 138; Rogers v. Cox, 66 N. J. L. 432; Goss 2,. Ellison, 136 Mass.
5o3. Upon the question whether the release of an apparent joint wrong-
doer releases those who are actually at fault, there is a conflict of authority.
Cooley on Torts, p. iO3; Thomas v. Cent. R. R. Co., 194 Pa. St. 511; Mis-
souri, K. & T. Ry. Co. z,. MclVherter, 59 Kan. 345; Western Tube Co. v.
Zang, 85 Ill. App. 63. However, the weight of authority would seem to be
with the above case, as indicated by the citations in the opinion.
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VENDOR AND PURCHASER-OPTION-VITHDRAWAL.-GOODMAN V. SPUR-
LIN, 62 S. E. i029 (GA.).--Hcld, that a written option, without considera-
tion, for the sale of land, may be withdrawn or revoked before its
acceptance.
An option is a mere continuing offer. Crandall v. Willig, 166 Ill. 233;
Sizer v. Clark, 93 N. W. 539. Like all other contracts, it must have con-
sideration in order to be binding. Ide v. Leiser, io Mont. 5. And the
fact that a period is named within which it may be accepted, will not pre-
vent a withdrawal within that time. B. & M. R. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224.
